MINNESOTA FAD RESPONSE PLAN

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Minnesota Board of Animal Health
Minnesota Department of Agriculture
625 Robert Street North
St Paul, MN 55155
651-296-2942 | www.mn.gov/bah

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose:

This plan defines the framework needed to detect, control, and eradicate a highly contagious foreign animal disease (FAD) in order to return farms to normal production and the United States to disease free status as efficiently as possible.

Situation:

Minnesota has an extensive and varied animal industry and as such is vulnerable to an outbreak of a foreign animal disease (FAD). Several serious foreign animal disease outbreaks have occurred in other states and countries resulting in devastating economic consequences. Control and eradication of these diseases consumes enormous amounts of resources and results in trade and national income loss.

Command and Control:

In contrast to the initial local emergency response to a fire, flood, or tornado, a foreign animal disease (FAD) response requires an initial rapid and coordinated state level response. The authorities for this response are held by the Minnesota Board of Animal Health (BAH). Veterinarians observing suspicious signs of disease or diagnostic laboratories that determine samples are positive for a FAD are required to report these findings to the BAH. The technical veterinary expertise required to implement measures to control the disease will be provided by the BAH and the US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service / Veterinary Services (USDA/VS).

Upon discovery of a FAD in Minnesota, the BAH will coordinate the initial response for the incident. Because of the limited size of the BAH, if the scope of a response exceeds its resources, the BAH may request support from the MDA through a Memorandum of Understanding. The Minnesota Emergency Operations Plan (MEOP) outlines the mechanism to request additional support from all resources of Minnesota state government through the activation of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). Support requested at the local level will be fulfilled through the SEOC as well. Although Minnesota counties have the responsibility to minimize the impact on their citizens for any incident, there exists no authority to command or make operational decisions for FAD incidents at the local level unless it is delegated by the BAH.

The US Department of Agriculture/Animal Plant Health and Inspections Service/Veterinary Services (USDA/VS) has responsibility, expertise and authority to address animal diseases that threaten U.S. agriculture. The USDA/VS provides the bulk of the funding at the local, state and national level for response to disease outbreaks because they all have a national/international impact. This funding may be delivered directly from USDA/VS to supporting agencies such as the BAH and MDA. Consequently, the BAH, MDA and USDA/VS maintain a unique relationship of cooperation in safeguarding Minnesota's livestock resources.

Initial Reporting and Investigation (1st Response):

Any member of the agriculture or animal health community might first detect an abnormal situation that indicates a possible FAD. Ideally, this detection will occur soon after the disease is introduced and will be reported to the BAH or Minnesota's USDA/VS Area office. Together, the State Veterinarian and the USDA/VS Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) for Minnesota will dispatch a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to investigate a report of a possible FAD.

The FADD will make a field diagnosis and in consultation with the State Veterinarian, the Commissioner of the MDA, and the AVIC will determine the likelihood of an FAD. Samples may be collected from affected animals and submitted for testing to a federal laboratory.

Concept of Operation:

Once a FAD is confirmed, the BAH will initiate the response to a FAD until support and resources are recruited from the MDA, USDA/VS, or the SEOC. To most efficiently manage the response, the state and federal animal health agencies will operate in Unified Command under the Incident Command System. An Incident Command Post (ICP) will be established in the vicinity of the incident. Operations are intended to bring the disease under control and eliminate it as quickly as possible using the following principles: 1) detect the disease quickly; 2) prevent contact between susceptible animals and the disease causing agent; 3) stop production of the disease causing agent by infected animals; and 4) increase the disease resistance of susceptible animals. The following activities are used to accomplish control and eradication:

- Stop animal movement (quarantine) from the affected premises
- Implement biosecurity measures on the premises to ensure the disease organism will not be moved off the farm through movement of vehicles or people
- Initiate an epidemiological investigation to:
 - o Identify contacts (animals, people, vehicles) who have recently moved on or off the premises and quarantine additional premises associated by contact
 - o Identify all properties in the appropriate area with susceptible animals and monitor these animals for signs of the disease
 - O Determine the possible contact between wildlife and infected animals and implement a plan to detect and control the disease
- Establish a control area (CA) and surveillance zone around infected premises which defines the activities to be conducted to detect and control the disease
 - o Define permitted movement of products and non -susceptible animals
 - O Define affected "compartments" within the industry and which other compartments can continue to operate with additional control measures and assessment
- Consider all options for depopulation of the affected animals after determining the value of the herd or flock
 - Controlled slaughter
 - o Humane depopulation and disposal without spreading the disease
- Clean and disinfect affected premises
- Initiate the information management plan
- Prepare to receive vaccine and develop vaccination plan if vaccination becomes a viable control measure (vaccinated animals may still need to be destroyed to regain diseasefree status)

II. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose

- 1. This plan defines the framework needed to detect, control and eradicate a highly contagious foreign animal disease (FAD) introduced into the State of Minnesota. The primary goal for the execution of this plan is to return farms to normal production and to get Minnesota and the rest of the United States to disease free status as efficiently as possible.
- 2. This plan also attempts to define the role of local, state, and the federal government in an FAD response in Minnesota.

B. Scope

- 1. This plan does not apply to those diseases proven to be zoonotic (diseases that affect both humans and animals ie monkey pox, West Nile virus) as these diseases fall under the primary jurisdiction of the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) with support from county health departments. For these instances, the BAH and MDA will be supporting agencies available to provide capabilities and resources for their responses when requested. The exception to this is when a zoonotic animal disease event is mainly confined to the animal population but has the potential to spill-over into the human population, the BAH shall be the lead response agency. In this case the MDH will be a supporting agency to the Board of Animal Health for any human disease surveillance and response operations.
- 2. Similarly, this plan does not apply to animals that are abandoned or neglected and those injured or killed by natural or technological disasters. Responses to these events are the responsibility of local government. The BAH and MDA will be supporting agencies for these responses as well and are available to provide capabilities and technical and tactical resources for their responses when requested.

III. AUTHORITIES

A. Local

Other than the responsibility to minimize the impact on its citizens from a FAD event, no authority to command or manage a FAD response including quarantine of livestock or poultry premises, depopulation of affected or potentially-affected premises and indemnification for taken animals or products exists at the local/county level.

B. State

The Executive Director of the Board of Animal Health, also known as the State Veterinarian, through the five member citizen Board, has the authority to quarantine or depopulate livestock or poultry that are exposed to a contagious or infectious dangerous disease if it is necessary to protect the health of the domestic

animals of the state. The State Veterinarian similarly has the authority to direct the operational activities to control and eradicate an FAD. He or she may also prohibit the arrival into and departure from the state of infected or exposed animals. See Attachment 1 for statutory authorities held by the BAH.

If the citizen Board determines that an FAD exists and represents a substantial and imminent threat to the state's domestic animal population, it shall so certify to the governor. After receiving certification from the BAH, the governor may declare an emergency for the purposes of allowing the BAH to establish emergency restrictions on the movement of people, livestock, machinery and other personal property.

C. Federal

The US Secretary of Agriculture has broad authorities and discretion for responding to and eliminating an animal disease. In connection with an emergency (not necessarily under a declaration of an Emergency) under which a disease of livestock threatens any segment of agricultural production in the United States, the Secretary may transfer funds, with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), from other agencies or corporations of the Department to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) or other USDA agencies to reimburse certain Federal, State, and local response expenses, including operational costs, such as quarantine enforcement, perimeter control, depopulation, carcass disposal, and decontamination.

The Secretary may also declare an Extraordinary Emergency, which allows for the use of Federal authorities to take action within a State if the State is unable to take appropriate action to control and eradicate the disease.

Numerous Federal agencies have authorities and responsibilities related to public, animal, and wildlife health, safety, and management. Many of these authorities include significant levels of discretion and may or may not be applied to an FAD response depending on the scope and magnitude of an outbreak.

IV. POLICIES

A. Prevent Introduction / Ensure Early Detection of a FAD

The BAH's highest priority is to prevent the introduction of a FAD into the state. Minnesota regulatory veterinarians are trained as FADDs to investigate and recognize foreign animal diseases in domestic livestock. There is ongoing monitoring of Minnesota livestock for foreign animal diseases via reporting of suspect animals to the BAH and subsequent investigation by a FADD. Should a foreign animal disease case be identified, the BAH in coordination with USDA/VS, MDA, Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM), and the County(s) where the case occurs, will launch a significant effort to eradicate the disease as expeditiously as possible through a variety of means with the overall goal to prevent the disease from spreading. See Attachment 2 for Guidelines for Investigation and Initial Response to a Foreign Animal Disease. See Attachment 3 Minnesota County Foreign Animal Disease Response Support Planning Guide.

B. Allow permitted movement of livestock and agricultural products when possible to provide business continuity (See VII, E, 6)

Although disease control is the highest priority, every attempt possible should be made to allow the movement of animals and agricultural products for the livestock or poultry industries. This is incumbent on the rapid implementation of additional biosecurity measures across affected industries and operational and logistical support to ensure these actions are sufficient to limit the spread of the disease. Prior planning by industry to identify these critical control points and what it takes to guarantee their success is essential.

C. Evaluate the role of wildlife associated with an FAD and control as needed

An outbreak of a foreign animal disease may be first detected either in wildlife or domestic animals. Intensive surveillance may be needed to determine the role of wildlife in the disease outbreak. Wildlife species are under the jurisdiction of either the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources or U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, depending on the specific wildlife species. If the disease is confirmed and wildlife species are suspected of spreading the disease, the agency with jurisdiction over the implicated species will oversee local, State, and national plans for depopulation or population reduction of the species. See Attachment XX 004-10 Wildlife Response for the BAH FAD Plan

D. Limit the animals sacrificed and conduct depopulation in a humane manner

All depopulation activities will be conducted in a manner that is as humane as possible while being expedient enough to stop the spread of the disease and limit the number of animals sacrificed.

E. Use disposal methods that stop disease spread with the least impact to the environment

Disposal methods should be effective in stopping the spread of the disease while having a minimal practical impact on the environment. If salvage of meat or protein is attainable while taking adequate biosecurity measures, it is preferred over carcass destruction. Attaining these goals highlights the need for prior planning between animal health and environmental agencies at the local, State, and national levels to identify suitable options for various sites and species.

F. Recovery

Recover operations will consist of 2 categories, 1) Care for the sick animals in an event and 2) Methods to release Control Zones to become disease free.

V. SITUATION

Minnesota has an extensive and varied animal industry in the state and as such is vulnerable to an outbreak of a foreign animal disease. Several serious foreign animal disease outbreaks have occurred in other states and countries resulting in devastating economic consequences. Control and eradication of these diseases consumes enormous amounts of resources and results in trade and national income loss.

VI. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

Some FADs may require only a limited response which will fall within the resource capabilities of the BAH, MN USDA/VS staff, MDA, and the affected county. Other FAD outbreaks like Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Classical Swine Fever (CSF), African Swine Fever (ASF) or Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) may totally overwhelm these agencies and their resources and will require the full resources of USDA-APHIS-VS and the National Veterinary Stockpile.

Although a FAD outbreak is not directed by local government because of their authority limitations for this type of an event, utilization of local public and private resources for its response will always be the most efficient option. The BAH and MDA will collaborate with Local government to plan for and support a FAD response to minimize its impact on their citizens as they would for any other potential hazard that threatens their community.

VII. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Coordination and Control

1. Incident Command

a. For a small scale FAD event, Unified Command between the BAH and MN USDA/VS will be instituted. For an incident requiring a larger response, the BAH and MN USDA/VS will delegate authority to the incident management team (IMT) of MDA to manage the response organization on their behalf. (See Attachment 4 for Delegation of Authority template) In either

- case, an ICP will be established as close to the affected county or counties as practical. After the initial event, a USDA/VS national IMT may be requested to relieve the initial IMT. See Attachment 5 for the template of the MN ICS structure for a FAD
- b. Depending on the scope of the response, the county EOC may be activated to provide local coordination of resources and policy to support the ICP.
- c. For a wide-spread FAD outbreak, multiple ICPs may be required across the state and Area Command established to provide direction to the incident commanders, prioritize resources among the incidents, and take supervisory burdens off of the agency administrators/executives. Similarly, multiple county EOCs will need to be activated to support the resource needs and coordination locally.

2. Lead Agencies

Although a small state agency, because of their statutory authority the BAH is the lead state agency for a FAD event and directs activities at the local and state level. Its corresponding federal agency is USDA/VS which not only has personnel permanently deployed throughout the state for day to day livestock and poultry disease program work but also serves as the funding stream for most FAD events.

3. Supporting Agencies

For small scale FAD events the participation of supporting agencies may be limited at both the state and federal level. For a larger scale event, many supporting agencies may be involved and county emergency management, HSEM, and FEMA may be requested to activate the SEOC and play coordinating roles for the non-technical functions of the response. For these large events, the state EOC, and the MDA may be activated and a joint field office (JFO) may be established. (See VIII. B. for specific roles)

4. Public Information and Reporting

The BAH will take the lead for public information and reporting at the local and state level. Even one infected animal with a FAD in the state requires the US to report this case internationally; therefore, all information dissemination will be coordinated with USDA. For a large scale FAD event, a Joint Information Center (JIC) will be established with each ICP and at the state and national level. Information management operations at each will correspond to their level within the incident response. JICs will include Public Information Officers (PIOs) from supporting agencies and industry. See Attachment 9 for the MN BAH Crisis Communication Plan

B. Initial Detection and Assessment

Veterinary practitioners in Minnesota have a responsibility to report any high morbidity or mortality event that might indicate a FAD. However, any member of the agriculture or animal health community might first detect the abnormal situation that indicates a possible FAD. Ideally, this detection will occur soon after the disease is introduced and will be reported to the Board or the Minnesota APHIS/VS Area office. Together, the State Veterinarian and the USDA/VS AVIC for

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Minnesota will dispatch one of their field veterinarians who is trained as a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to investigate a report of a possible FAD. See Attachment 6, VSG 12001.3 which outlines guidance by USDA/VS for the investigation of a potential FAD.

The FADD who may be a BAH or USDA/VS employee will make a field diagnosis and in consultation with the State Veterinarian, the Commissioner of the MDA, and the AVIC will determine the likelihood of a FAD. Duplicate samples will be collected from affected animals and submitted for testing to a federal laboratory and an appropriate National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory with priority based on the field diagnosis and consultation. For all FAD investigations where an outbreak is possible based on the field diagnosis, the premises is quarantined pending laboratory results. If the field diagnosis is consistent with a known FAD, disease control such as enhanced biosecurity and review of facility (farm, processing plant, auction, etc.) records for animal movements on and off the premises may be initiated immediately. See Attachment 2 for Guidelines for Investigation and Initial Response to a Foreign Animal Disease.

C. Notification, Activation, and Deployment

For a potential FAD event, notification is a delicate tightrope. Rapid response is the key to early control of disease spread but a leak of information about an investigation that becomes a non-event and makes its way to international trading partners may cost the US livestock industries millions of dollars in lost revenues while the false information is sorted out. While the initial case presumptive results may come within 18 hours, the initial confirmatory laboratory results may not be available for 1-2 days from the start of the investigation. For the first FAD case in MN, public announcement cannot be sent out until USDA has done so first.

At this point in the response, local government has not been informed of a potential event in their geographical jurisdiction. The BAH confidence in local information control will determine time of notification. When presumptive laboratory results are consistent with the field diagnosis and indicate the possible presence of a FAD, the ICP will be established and staffed by BAH, APHIS and MDA employees from around the state and operational activities will begin.

D. Resource Allocation

Depending on the scope of the incident, the county EOC may be activated to support the ICP. Local resources may be requested to determine the ICP location and to provide personnel and resources to fill out the response organization with tactical and support resources. The kinds of resources requested may include agricultural outreach specialists, animal handlers,

excavation equipment and operators, and clerks. How and where resources are used on the incident will be determined by the incident management team based on the incident objectives.

Resources will also be available through the USDA National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) and can be requested through USDA channels. See Attachment 7 for the MN BAH NVS Plan

E. Disease Control and Eradication Activities

Measures to control and eradicate the disease will be based on the science of the individual disease including infectivity, incubation period, morbidity and mortality, detection and prevention methods. Measures include:

1. Quarantine and Restricted Movement

To effectively prevent the spread of the outbreak, use of quarantine and movement controls will be implemented proportionate to the threat. For FMD and other highly contagious and devastating diseases, not only will the infected and contact premises be placed under quarantine, disease management zones will be established around these premises with only specified activities allowed in each (See Attachment 8 USDA APHIS FAD Prep FMD Response Plan). In an attempt to reestablish Free Zones as quickly as possible to support the continuity of business in the rest of Minnesota and the US, the infected county, counties, or even the whole state may have movement of susceptible animals and products stopped or restricted until the situation can be sorted out and areas can be proven to be free of the disease. For infected premises, animal, people and vehicle movement from affected premises will be restricted or controlled to prevent disease spread.

2. <u>Containment</u>

Employ biosecurity measures to ensure the disease agent is not spread by allowable movement. Stop production of the disease organism or increase resistance to the disease within the susceptible animal population by vaccinations or other methods, See Biosecurity guidelines and protocols

3. Surveillance

Monitor susceptible animals with previous contact or within geographic proximity to affected premises for early detection and response to disease spread, This includes wildlife species that may have contact with infected animals and potentially become infected with the disease. See protocols on surveillance guidelines

4. <u>Depopulation and Disposal</u>

Prompt depopulation and disposal of animals is critical to eliminate a source of the disease. Fair and prompt appraisal is required for the depopulation process to continue. For the diseases covered by this plan

(none are significant threats to human health), disposal of carcasses and other debris generated by control measures from an FAD should be conducted using the local plan for debris generated by a natural or technological incident. Because the scope of disposal operations may greatly exceed that of other events, mutual aid or state resources may have to be requested early in the response to keep up with the workload. For an FAD, disposal operations will require enhanced biosecurity measures to prevent spread of the disease agent however effective cleaning and disinfection of equipment and operators will substantially reduce risk.

5. <u>Cleaning and Disinfection</u>

Effectively disinfect and decontaminate equipment and materials to eliminate disease organism. In most cases, the most difficult part of disinfection and decontamination of a premises or conveyance for a FAD agent is removal of infectious organic matter. Once the organic matter is cleaned away and disposed of in an appropriate manner, disinfection is accomplished by using the appropriate disinfection process for that FAD agent. See Attachment 9 Potential Disinfectants for use on FAD Agents on Farm.

6. Permitted Movement

During a FAD outbreak, movement of feed, animals, their products or byproducts in a just-in-time delivery system, such as exists in US agriculture, could be significantly impacted by movement restrictions during a foreign animal disease outbreak. Movement restrictions are put in place based on the concern of disease spread via transportation. The response must include a plan for the permitted biosecure movement of these products to allow continuation of business activity. See "Secure Food Plans"

www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/emergency-management/ct_fadprep_continuity_of_business

VIII. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Primary Agencies

1. Board of Animal Health

Conduct prevention, preparedness including planning, training and exercising activities to prevent the introduction of the disease, detect it early, and respond quickly and efficiently to minimize its impact on the state and its animal agricultural industries.

2. Department of Agriculture

Although not responsible for primary management of FAD outbreaks, it is responsible for consumer confidence and supporting the state's agriculture industry. This is achieved through planning, training and conducting exercises to execute its all-hazards plan and makes available its IMT to manage a large-scale FAD event on behalf of the BAH.

3. Department of Health

As stated in the Introduction, when a potentially zoonotic FAD event is mainly confined to the animal population but has the potential to spill-over into the human population, the BAH shall continue to be the lead response agency. In this case the MDH will be a supporting agency to the Board of Animal Health for any human disease surveillance and response operations.

4. USDA APHIS Veterinary Services

As the federal agency responsible for FADs and in full partnership with the BAH on a state level, will conduct preparedness activities including planning, training and exercises designed to prevent the introduction of disease. The agency will work to detect FADs early and respond in a quick and efficient manner to minimize its impact on the state and its animal agricultural industries. For most FAD outbreaks, serves as the source of federal funding for operations and indemnity. The BAH will coordinate with USDA/VS on animal loss and cost assessments regarding a FAD event.

B. Support Agencies and Their Contracted Services

1. County Government

To minimize the impact on its citizens, by planning, training, and exercising to support an FAD event; activate its EOC and provide resources in a response, and participate in the recovery process

2 State Agencies

Many state agencies have authorities and capabilities either within their agency or through their standing contracts that might apply to an FAD response, such as for emergency and incident management, wildlife control, environmental protection, health protection and law enforcement. Assistance from supporting state agencies will be requested in accordance with their own authorities and the Minnesota Emergency Operations Plan (MEOP).

3 Federal Agencies

Similarly, many federal agencies have authorities and capabilities either through their agency or their standing contracts that might apply to an FAD response such as for emergency and incident management, wildlife control, environmental protection, health protection and law enforcement. Assistance from supporting federal agencies will be requested in accordance with their own authorities and the NRF.